In this monograph R. W. Beardsmore presents a lucid and readable presentation of what he takes moral reasoning to be and what he expects moral reasoning to accomplish. It is another in the long list of works which attempt to apply later-Wittgensteinian insights to the problems of ethics. The common moves run this way: Wittgenstein insists that to say that something is justified, or to say there are justifiable reasons for some position implies some fundamental agreement in our language game. (...) Moral argumentation can only take place within the context of a shared ethical language game. This moral viewpoint invests, what appear to be facts with value. According to Beardsmore the importance of shared moral viewpoints is missed by R. M. Hare with his dichotomizing of fact and value and his insistence on a decision of principle. Beardsmore also attacks the position of Phillipa Foot whom he sees on the opposite side of the issue from Hare. He sees Foot as insisting on the necessary dependence of values upon facts, which leads to her inability to account for changing moral viewpoints. Beardsmore tries to show that these views of Foot and Hare agree at least on one point, that there must be one specific way to give reasons for moral positions and hence solve moral disputes. Beardsmore has made a significant contribution by offering an illuminating application of Wittgenstein's insights to the problems of ethical theory. If they did nothing more, these insight's would be important in so far as they help to unlock the hold that the fact-value dichotomy has imposed on ethical theory for so long.--R. F. D. (shrink)

With his usual conciseness and lucidity, Körner attempts to show what philosophy is by looking at what it does, i.e., by investigating its problems, its branches and its history. Körner begins by setting out classic problems ranging from the problem of class-existence to the problem of freedom, and follows this by an investigation of various methodologies. After this introductory material the bulk of the book ranges over the central problems of most branches of philosophy and concludes with a brief sketch (...) of the history of philosophy. Of special note is Körner's treatment of metaphysics to which he gives an entire section of almost seventy pages. Those familiar with Körner's other work will find it a concise summary of his notion of metaphysics as exhibition and/or replacement-analysis of categorial frameworks. Also of note is his refreshing treatment of philosophy of mind. He sees the problem of intentionality as the chief consideration for that branch of philosophy. Although he makes mention of the linguistic approach to philosophy of mind his main thrust is to set the problems in Brentano's terms and show how the mind-body problem and theories of truth are handled from that framework. There are some drawbacks in the book. First: given the length of his treatment of metaphysics one could wish that somewhere Körner in his explication of metaphysics had given some recognition to the realistic alternatives to his transcendental metaphysics. Second: one must wonder to whom the book is addressed. The conciseness of Körner's style allows him to range over an unbelievably large area, but in such a pithy manner that it seems almost unimaginable that the educated layman will be able to follow the presentations and arguments, particularly those interspersed with logical notation. For example, how much value is there in condensing the logic of truth-functions, quantification and axiomatization into less than ten pages? For those in the field it is repetitive, for those not, it must be nearly unintelligible. One feels Körner really wanted to write a defense of metaphysics. This may have been a more efficacious project eliminating the need to write first for one audience then for another. The book is concise, lucid, and illuminating.--R. F. D. (shrink)

IntroductionIn this study, we tested a simple, active “ethical consistency” intervention aimed at reducing researchers’ endorsement of questionable research practices (QRPs).MethodsWe developed a simple, active ethical consistency intervention and tested it against a control using an established QRP survey instrument. Before responding to a survey that asked about attitudes towards each of fifteen QRPs, participants were randomly assigned to either a consistency or control 3–5-min writing task. A total of 201 participants completed the survey: 121 participants were recruited from a (...) database of currently funded NSF/nih scientists, and 80 participants were recruited from a pool of active researchers at a large university medical center in the southeastern US. Narrative responses to the writing prompts were coded and analyzed to assist post hoc interpretation of the quantitative data.ResultsWe hypothesized that participants in the consistency condition would find ethically ambiguous QRPs less defensible and would indicate less willingness to engage in them than participants in the control condition. The results showed that the consistency intervention had no significant effect on respondents’ reactions regarding the defensibility of the QRPs or their willingness to engage in them. Exploratory analyses considering the narrative themes of participants’ responses indicated that participants in the control condition expressed lower perceptions of QRP defensibility and willingness.ConclusionThe results did not support the main hypothesis, and the consistency intervention may have had the unwanted effect of inducing increased rationalization. These results may partially explain why RCR courses often seem to have little positive effect. (shrink)

This paper examines some ethical issues arising from whole-genome association studies for multigenic diseases, focusing on the case of autism. Events occurring following the announcement of a genetic test for autism in France (2005–2009) are described to exemplify the ethical controversies that can arise when genetic testing for autism is applied prematurely and inappropriately promoted by biotech companies. The authors argue that genetic tests assessing one or a few genes involved in highly multigenic disorders can only be useful if: (1) (...) the genetic linkage found in the scientific study must be statistically convincing, reproducible and also applicable to the population to which the individual considered belongs (scientific validity); (2) the relative risk conferred by the ‘high-risk’ allele should be high enough to be significant to the patient (significant impact); (3) use of the test should lead to some improvement of outcome for the patient, resulting from adapted treatment if available, or at least from adjustment of lifestyle (or life goals) prompted by the new knowledge generated (clinical utility). Decisions concerning genetic testing for autism involve scientific judgement, value judgement and good knowledge of a constantly evolving therapeutic environment. The implementation of genetic tests for highly multigenic diseases thus requires strong mechanisms to ensure that they are used in a fashion that can benefit patients, and these mechanisms must be able to cope with rapid progress in scientific knowledge and therapeutic intervention. (shrink)

All logic instruments and tools in possession of, and used by researchers are generally considered as the results of bivalent logic. A common error to people interested in science is that, usually, they don’t known with certainty which things are true and which are false. But they are sure that things are true or false. No ways in the middle. The fuzzy principle asserts that this is completely a question of measure. Fuzziness is the opposite concept to bivalency, while fuzzy (...) quality means polyvalency. Fuzzy logic is able to manage uncertain knowledge and, more precisely, to manage those rules difficult to formalize. In many cases, such rules haven’t got, or cannot have, the necessary precision, required for a whole formalization. (shrink)

B. R. Frieden uses a single procedure, called extreme physical information, with the aim of deriving 'most known physics, from statistical mechanics and thermodynamics to quantum mechanics, the Einstein field equations and quantum gravity'. His method, which is based on Fisher information, is given a detailed exposition in this book, and we attempt to assess the extent to which he succeeds in his task.

BackgroundPreprint usage is growing rapidly in the life sciences; however, questions remain on the relative quality of preprints when compared to published articles. An objective dimension of quality that is readily measurable is completeness of reporting, as transparency can improve the reader’s ability to independently interpret data and reproduce findings.MethodsIn this observational study, we initially compared independent samples of articles published in bioRxiv and in PubMed-indexed journals in 2016 using a quality of reporting questionnaire. After that, we performed paired comparisons (...) between preprints from bioRxiv to their own peer-reviewed versions in journals.ResultsPeer-reviewed articles had, on average, higher quality of reporting than preprints, although the difference was small, with absolute differences of 5.0% [95% CI 1.4, 8.6] and 4.7% [95% CI 2.4, 7.0] of reported items in the independent samples and paired sample comparison, respectively. There were larger differences favoring peer-reviewed articles in subjective ratings of how clearly titles and abstracts presented the main findings and how easy it was to locate relevant reporting information. Changes in reporting from preprints to peer-reviewed versions did not correlate with the impact factor of the publication venue or with the time lag from bioRxiv to journal publication.ConclusionsOur results suggest that, on average, publication in a peer-reviewed journal is associated with improvement in quality of reporting. They also show that quality of reporting in preprints in the life sciences is within a similar range as that of peer-reviewed articles, albeit slightly lower on average, supporting the idea that preprints should be considered valid scientific contributions. (shrink)

Adaptive management is commonly identified as a way to address situations where ecological and social uncertainty exists. Two discourses are common: a focus on experimentation, and a focus on collaboration. The roles of experimental and collaborative adaptive management in contemporary practice are reviewed to identify tools for bridging the discourses. Examples include broadening the scope of contributions during the buy-in and goal-setting stages, using conceptual models and decision support tools to include stakeholders in model development, experimentation using indicators of concern (...) to stakeholders, an experimental focus that reflects the level of statistical confidence required by management, and the engagement of stakeholders in data interpretation so that those affected by management outcomes can learn and adapt accordingly. In this context, a framework of questions that managers can use to reflect on both ecological and social uncertainties as they relate to individual management contexts is proposed. (shrink)

Even today, a century after the publication of the “Origin of Species”, current zoological literature often reveals an insufficient grasp of the implications of the now generally accepted view that it is natural selection that confers direction on the evolutionary process.This is, in part, due to a reaction against oversimplified teleology and against Lamarckism. In rejecting Lamarck's thesis that the activities of an animal directly affect its hereditary characters it is frequently assumed that this implies that such activities are irrelevant (...) to the study of evolution. This is a non-sequitur, for activities may affect evolution not directly, through heredity, but indirectly, by influencing the direction of the selective forces impinging on the organism. Reasons are given for concluding that changes in habits and behaviour frequently precede structural change and, in fact, determine the direction of the latter.As an example of a concept which deserves a more evolutionary treatment than it commonly receives, the subject of neoteny is considered. It appears that failure to think in terms of the selective forces involved has frequently led to error. An analysis in functional terms is made of the theory that the chordates represent secondarily glorified sea-squirts and it is concluded that this idea is unlikely to be correct. The characteristics of man that are commonly considered to be neotenous are also discussed. It is concluded that a facile and unanalytical application of the label “neoteny” to many of the evolutionary changes involved has tended to obscure rather than to clarify their significance: the neotenous features of man are not those that have been of primary importance in human evolution, but are secondary to the acquisition of new characters which are not to be found in either the adult or the young stages of any other primate.Aujourd'hui, un siècle après l'apparition de l'Originedes Espèces, la conviction est presque générale que la sélection naturelle dirige le procès de l'évolution. Néanmoins, les publications zoologiques actuelles révèlent souvent une compréhension insuffisante de ce qui en résulte.Ceci doit en partie être considéré comme réaction contre une téléologie simpliste et contre le Lamarckisme. En rejetant la thèse de Lamarck, que les activités d'un animal ont une influence directe sur ses caractéristiques héréditaires, on admet fréquemment que de pareilles activités n'ont rien à voir avec l'étude le l'évolution. Cependant, une telle conclusion n'est pas justifiée, car les activités peuvent influer sur l'évolution non pas directement, par la voie de l'hérédité, mais indirectement en agissant sur la direction des forces sélectives que l'organisme rencontre. Des raisons ont été données qui mènent à conclure que des changements dans les habitudes et dans le comportement précèdent maintes fois le changement structural et même déterminent la direction de celui-ci.Comme exemple d'un concept qui mérite un traitement plus évolutionniste qu'il ne reçoive en général, la néoténie a été examinée. Il paraît que l'on a fait beaucoup d'erreurs en ne tenant pas compte des forces sélectives engagées. Une analyse au pointde-vue de la fonction a été appliquée à la théorie que les chordées ne sont que des ascidies néoténiques transfigurées par après, et il s'ensuit que cette idée n'est probablement pas correcte. Aussi les caractéristiques de l'homme généralement regardées comme neoténiques ont été discutées. Il en résulte que, en désignant légèrement et sans analyse plusieurs changements évolutionnaires comme néoténie, on a plutôt obsurci qu'éclairci leur signification. Ce ne sont pas les traits néoteniques de l'homme qui ont joué le rôle principal dans l'évolution humaine; au contraire, ils n'apparaissent qu'après l'acquisition de quelques nouvelles caractéristiques qui ne se trouvent ni dans l'adulte ni dans les phases plus jeunes des autres primates.Sogar heutzutage, ein Jahrhundert nach dem Erscheinen der „Origin of Species”, zeigt die jetzige zoologische Literatur oft eine unzulängliche Einsicht in die Folgerungen, zu denen die jetzt allgemein akzeptierte Annahme leitet, dass die natürliche Selektion die Richtung des Evolutionsprozesses bedingt.Dies ist teilweise zu sehen als eine Reaktion gegen eine einseitige Teleologie und gegen das Lamarckismus. Bei der Ablehnung der TheseLamarck's, dass die Aktivitäten eines Tieres einen direkten Einfluss ausüben auf seine erbliche Konstitution, nimmt man oft an, dass dies bedeutet, dass derartige Aktivitäten demnach nichts zur Sache tun bei dem Studium der Evolution. Zu einer derartigen Konklusion ist man jedoch nicht berechtigt, denn, obwohl die Aktivitäten die Evolution nicht direkt beeinflussen können mittels der Erblichkeit, so können sie dies jedoch indirekt, weil sie die Richtung der selektiven Kräfte, welche auf das Organismus einwirken, bestimmen. Es werden Argumente gegeben, welche die Konklusion rechtfertigten, dass Änderungen in Gewohnheit und Verhalten oft Strukturänderungen vorhergehen und tatsächlich die Richtung dieser letztgenannten bestimmen. Die Neotenie wirdt als ein Beispiel eines Begriff betrachtet, welcher eine mehr evolutionäre Behandlung verdient als bisher geschehen ist. Es ergibt sich dass man viele Irrtümer hat gemacht, indem man den betreffenden selektiven Kräften keine Rechnung getragen hat. Eine Analyse der Theorie, welche die Chordaten als neotenische Ascidien betrachtet, wird von einem funktionellen Gesichtspunkt aus durchgeführt. Daraus scheint der Schluss berechtigt, dass diese Theorie falsch ist. Auch werden die menschlichen Kennzeichen, welche gewöhnlich als neotenische betrachtet werden, besprochen. Die Konklusion lautet, dass, wenn man leichtfertig und ohne genügende Analyse den Zettel „Neotenie“ für mancherlei evolutive Änderungen anwendet, man die richtige Bedeutung dieser Erscheinung vielmehr verdunkelt als aufklärt: nicht die neotenische Kennzeichen des Menschen sind am wichtigsten in seiner Evolution; in Gegenteil sie erscheinen nur sekundär, nachdem die neuen Kennzeichen, welche sich weder in den Erwachsenen noch in den jüngeren Stadien von den anderen Primaten finden lassen, erschienen sind. (shrink)

Professor D. Z. Phillips in ‘Bad Faith and Sartre's Waiter’ assigns to Sartre the view that ‘waiters are necessarily in bad faith’, i.e. the profession of waiting as such is in bad faith. What could this mean in the context of Sartre's philosophy? That waiters as a class seek to flee their freedom by adopting that vocation? It must mean something on those lines since, for Sartre, to engage in bad faith is to deny one's freedom. The question then arises: (...) could Sartre have heldsuch a view ? And, if he could not have, how does Phillips manage tothink he did ? (shrink)

Es wird versucht nachzuweisen wiesehr Husserl neben der immer erneuten Übung der Phänomenologie als ein Instrument genauester philosophischer Analyse immer mit metaphysischen Fragen „alten Stils” beschäftigt gewesen ist : Ursprung der Welt, Existenz Gottes, Möglichkeit und Sinn der Geschichte, Unsterblichkeit. Solche und ähnliche Probleme hat er angeschnitten und neu zu beantworten versucht auf dem von ihm nie verlassenen Boden der transzendentalsubjektiven Phänomenologie. Die Frage ist eben wie eine solche Phänomenologie, die vom Bewusstsein als dem Absoluten, das „nulla ‘re’ indiget ad (...) existendum” ausgeht und daran immer festgehalten hat mit der metaphysischen Problematik ins Reine kommt, namentlich wenn das mit der Transzendenz Gottes gemeinte Absolute dem Bewusstseinsabsoluten gegenüber als „ total verschieden” und „übertranszendentalsubjektiv” bezeichnet wird. Stösst das transzendentale Bewusstsein irgendwo auf Absolutes, das es unter Verzicht auf seinen konstitutiven Leistungscharakter ohne weiteres hinzunehmen hat ? Von Fink stammt die Bemerkung dass man Husserl als dem „Philosophen des Kleingeldes” seine unspekulative Gesinnung nicht als Schwachheit anrechnen darf, weil in der sorgfältigen Analyse eben seine Stärke liege. Ich möchte demgegenüber betonen dass eine „manque d'esprit métaphysique” sich bei Husserl eben nicht nachweisen lässt, wie auch aus seinen geschichtsphilosophischen Bemühungen eindeutig hervorgeht. In dieser letzten Beziehung liesse sich fragen inwiefern eine Philosophie, die den Ursprung der Geschichte in die transzendentale Subjektivität verlegt auf die „wirkliche” Geschichte als das „grosse Faktum des absoluten Seins” sich zu berufen ein Recht hat. Jedenfalls dürfte klar sein dass es neben Husserl, dem geduldigen, sorgfältigen, auf das Detail hinsehenden phänomenologischen Analytiker einen durch metaphysische Fragen in andauernder Unruhe versetzten Husserl gegeben hat. (shrink)

Fanciful fates is a discussion of ideas put forward by D.Z. Phillips in his book Wittgenstein and Religion, Ch. 13 –‘Authorship and Authenticity: Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein’. I begin by opposing the contention that Kierkegaard attacked Socrates (and that Josiah Thompson, one of Kierkegaard’s biographers, attacked Kierkegaard) because of a worry connected with the ‘the demise of foundationalism’. I then deal with Phillips's claim that a similarly motivated attack on Wittgenstein has been undertaken by me. I show that Phillips’s account of (...) my treatment of two problematic remarks by Wittgenstein is radically misconceived and I argue that his own approach to the problem is unsatisfactory. (shrink)

Plato's Republic has proven to be of astounding influence and importance. Justly celebrated as Plato's central text, it brings together all of his prior works, unifying them into a comprehensive vision that is at once theological, philosophical, political, and moral. These essays provide a state-of-the-art research picture of the most interesting aspects of the Republic, and address questions that continue to puzzle and provoke, such as: Does Plato succeed in his argument that the life of justice is the most attractive (...) one? Is his tripartite analysis of the soul coherent and plausible? Why does Plato seem to have to force his philosopher-guardians to rule when they know this is something that they ought to do? What is the point of the strange and complicated closing Myth of Er? This volume will be essential to those looking for thoughtful and detailed excursions into the problems posed by Plato's text and ideas. (shrink)